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Introduction
For social scientists, social justice is a topic of prime concern, because of the quest for social justice in itself and because of the trade-off between efficiency and social justice (e.g., Hillman 2009: chapter 7) . Social justice is also a prominent topic in public discourse and political attention: politicians promise to achieve social justice when elected to office.
Political parties use the term justice frequently in their party platforms.
Globalization has been a much studied phenomenon and there have been concerns whether globalization is consistent with social justice. The debate has been controversial (for an overview of the debate see Hillman 2008) . We examine the relationship between globalization and social justice as measured by a new social justice indicator.
John Rawls' "Theory of justice" in 1971 viewed social justice in terms of a social contract chosen behind a veil of ignorance when individuals do not yet know the positions they will have in society. The citizens thus decide from a neutral perspective. Rawls endorses equal rights "to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others" and inequalities that are "to be of the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society" while "offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity". Rawls thus considers both procedural and distributive aspects of social justice. 3 In response to Rawls' egalitarian position Robert Nozick took a libertarian view of social justice ("Anarchy, state and utopia", 1974) . Starting from a state of nature, a "dominant protection agency" emerges based on voluntary contracts. This dominant protection agency is the minimal state. Nozick thus considers an allocation as fair when the allocation is based on free and mutual exchange, even if large inequalities result. Nozick thus views social justice as procedural justice. 4 Friedrich August von Hayek took the position that only procedural justice is possible in a market economy ("The mirage of social justice ", 1976) . A fair distribution is not achievable as in a market economy no one distributes income. Social justice is thus a superstition that has to be opposed when the term is used to justify coercion of some by others. Amartya Sen ("Equality of what?", 1979 and "Development as freedom", 2000) suggests basic capability equality. The capability approach focuses on what individuals are capable of and thus includes for example political freedom and social opportunities rather than solely income.
The different concepts of social justice show that social justice is difficult to define and consequently difficult to measure unambiguously. Moreover, social justice ex post is multifaceted. The Bertelsmann Stiftung has compiled new data on social justice in OECD countries. The data include quantitative and qualitative indicators based on expert opinions.
The social justice indicator of the Bertelsmann Stiftung received prominent attention in the public debate on social justice. 5 An important question concerns what gives rise to or impedes social justice. We focus on how globalization is associated with social justice. Advocates of the dark side of globalization believe that globalization exerts negative effects on social justice. Joseph Stiglitz, for example, proposes that poor people are left behind and so disadvantaged in the course of globalization. "Also in industrialized countries unskilled workers learn what is going on."
6 Paul Krugman, by contrast, does not hold globalization responsible for social injustice in the United States, but claims that market-oriented policies of the political right 4 Mezzetti (1987) portrays the nexus between Pareto efficiency and the theories of Rawls and Nozick. For an experimental investigation of distributive justice see Traub et al. (2005) . On equality of opportunity see Hansson (2004) , Roemer (2002) , Roemer et al. (2003), and Sugden (2004) . 5 The article in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (3 January 2011): "Lücken in der sozialen Gerechtigkeit" elaborated on the social justice indicator in detail. 6 Interview with Die Welt on 30 September 2006.
increased inequality: "Growing international trade plays some role in growing inequality, but it is, literally, a fraction of a fraction of the story." 7 Indeed, income inequality is often used as synonym for social injustice. We elaborate on theoretical predictions and empirical findings on why globalization is expected to threaten or promote social justice in section 2.
Social justice encompasses sub-dimensions such as distributive justice and procedural justice. Poverty prevention, access to education, or intergenerational justice are also subdimensions of social justice. Globalization may well influence sub-dimensions of social justice differently. By using the KOF index of globalization and the social justice indicators of the Bertelsmann Stiftung, we examine how globalization is associated with different dimensions of social justice.
Globalization and social justice
The standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade predicts that a country's relatively abundant factors gain and a country's relatively scarce factors lose from globalization. In high-income countries, skilled workers should thus gain from globalization, and unskilled workers should lose from globalization. Social injustice in consequence of globalization should thus be prevalent in high-income countries (see Hillman 2008: 181) . The relation between globalization and social justice is, however, controversial.
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Some commentators believe that global trade and changing power relations in the course of globalization are inimical to social justice. The market economy is only legitimized if institutions ensure redistribution; but growing "authorities beyond the state" result in erosion of such institutions (Strange 1996: 197 Jones (2010) for an overview of "key thinkers" of globalization. On "dark sides" of globalization, focusing on non-economic issues in developing countries, see Heine and Thakur (2011) . On inequality and social justice see, for example, Arrow et al. (2000) and Gandolfo and Marzano (1999) .
and eliminating social services" (Martin and Schumann 1997: 6) . Advocates of the dark side of globalization have tended to assume that social justice is jeopardized when social expenditures and thus income redistribution decrease or labor markets are deregulated (e.g., through lax minimum wage legislation and employment protection). The "most serious challenge for the world economy" may thus lie "in making globalization compatible with domestic social and political stability" (Rodrik 1997: 2) . Some commentators also believe that trade liberalization has been "pushed too far, too fast", and at the expense of increased unemployment (Stiglitz 2002: 53-54, 59 ). The problem "is not with globalization itself, but in the way globalization has been managed" (Stiglitz 2006: 4) . The policy prescription is thus that governments "have the right to protect their social arrangements, and when this right clashes with the requirements of the global economy, it is the latter that should give way" (Rodrik 2011: xix) .
The opponents of globalization, however, may well hold globalization responsible for developments not caused by globalization: it is conceivable that technical change rather than globalization has caused declining real wages (Bhagwati 2004: 29-30, 122-123; see also Wolf 2005: 170 and Norberg 2003: 140) . Advocates of the positive side of globalization propose that globalization has reduced the number and share of people living in extreme poverty, and that globalization has improved indicators of human welfare, such as life expectancy or literacy (Wolf 2005 : 157-166, 171, see also Norberg 2003 . People may also enjoy lower prices for goods and services in the course of globalization and thus a higher standard of living (Kitching 2001: 30-31 (Leibrecht et al. 2011) . 9 The results of Dreher et al. (2008b) , by contrast, did not show that globalization influenced budget composition.
10
Income equality is usually viewed one of the most important determinants of social justice. Studies of how globalization influences inequality find mixed evidence. 11 Freedom to trade, social globalization, and deregulation have -in contrast to political globalizationexacerbated income inequality (Bergh and Nilsson 2010) . In OECD countries, in particular, previous studies have shown that globalization was positively correlated with income inequality (Dreher and Gaston 2008) . However, Doerrenberg and Peichl (2014) use Gini coefficients based on micro data and do not conclude that globalization has been positively correlated with income inequality in OECD countries. Berggren (1999) shows that trade liberalization and financial deregulation were negatively correlated with income inequality.
Also Savvides (1998) and foreign direct investment has improved conditions for women such as participation in parliamentary office, literacy, and life expectancy (Gray et al. 2006) . By using the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, globalization has been shown to improve women's economic and social rights and human rights as measured by physical integrity rights (Cho 2013 , De Soysa and Vadlamannati 2011 , and Dreher et al. 2012 ). Globalization has also been shown to enhance the willingness to transmit tolerance (Berggren and Nilsson 2014) .
The efficiency and the compensation hypothesis may also explain how globalization influences labor market institutions. Globalization may induce a "race to the bottom" in labor market regulation as governments compete e.g. for foreign direct investment (Sinn 2003) . It is, however, also conceivable that globalization induces a higher demand for labor market regulation because of increased uncertainty in a global market. The results of Potrafke (2010 and do not show that globalization has reduced labor market regulation. The results of Davies and Vadlamannati (2013) , however, show that countries compete in labor practices (enforcement), but not in labor laws. In low-income countries, globalization has been shown to improve labor rights (Vadlamannati 2015) . 12 Poverty prevention is another important aspect of social justice. Absolute income poverty has been shown to be lower in more globalized countries (Bergh and Nilsson 2014) .
Overall, how globalization affects social justice remains as an undetermined empirical question.
Data and empirical strategy 3.1 Data on social justice
We use the dataset collected by the Bertelsmann Stiftung on social justice (http://www.sginetwork.org). The data are available for 31 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
12 Globalization also increased protection in the agricultural sector (Garmann 2014 ).
The social justice indicator is based on five sub-indicators: poverty prevention, equitable access to education, labor market inclusiveness, social cohesion and equality, and intergenerational justice.
These five sub-indicators are based on 18 quantitative measures such as the Gini coefficient, unemployment rates, public expenditures on research and development, and seven qualitative measures such as expert opinions on education policy. Table A1 Table A2 reports the data in detail.
Data on globalization
We measure globalization with the help of the KOF index. The KOF index explicitly acknowledges that globalization is a multifaceted concept that cannot be entirely captured by an individual "representative" economic indicator such as international trade as a share of GDP, the volume or stock of received foreign direct investments per capita, or the severity of capital account restrictions. The KOF index (see Dreher 2006b , Dreher et al. 2008a represents an attempt to measure globalization in the broad sense that has been accepted in the empirical literature (see Potrafke 2014) . 13 The 2013 KOF index covers 207 countries, includes 23 variables, and portrays the economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization.
Each of these three dimensions is composed of further sub-dimensions. For example, with the intergenerational justice sub-indicator.
The empirical model
The base-line econometric model has the following form: …,31; j=1,…,7, k=1,…,6 where the dependent variable Social justice ij denotes the social justice indicator j in country i.
Globalization i describes the globalization variable. Σ k X ik contains six economic control variables. Political parties may well promote different concepts of social justice. 16 We include the ideology indices by Potrafke (2009) and Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) , which are based on the index of governments' ideological positions by Budge et al. (1993) and updated by Woldendorp et al. (1998 Woldendorp et al. ( , 2000 To be sure, we acknowledge that 31 observations describe a small sample and that the properties of the OLS estimator (as nearly all estimators) only hold for a large number of observations. We therefore keep the number of explanatory variables small to not further reduce the degrees of freedom. Table 1 reports the regression results when we use the weighted social justice indicator. We include the explanatory variables separately to show that inferences regarding the wing societies (Bjørnskov 2005) . Government ideology has not explained life satisfaction . 17 Coding governments in OECD countries on a left-right scale is not controversial. Experts have used several indicators for government ideology in OECD countries to investigate the influence on economic policy-making and stressed that results are not sensitive to the choice of the government ideology indicator (e.g., Pickering and Rockey 2011).
Results

Basic results
globalization variable do not change when individual explanatory variables are included/excluded. The KOF index of globalization is statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level in columns (1) to (5). The numerical meaning of the coefficients is that when the KOF index of globalization increases by one point (on a scale from 1 to 100), the social justice indicator increases by about 0.04 to 0.08 points (on a scale from 1 to 10). In other words, when the KOF index of globalization increases by one standard deviation, the social justice indicator increases by about 0.37 to 0.76 points (on a scale from 1 to 10). Globalization thus had a numerically important effect on social justice. Government ideology, by contrast, has not been associated with the weighted social justice indicator. The coefficients of the government ideology variable lack statistical significance in columns (2) to (5). The coefficients of the log real GDP per capita variable are statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (4) and (5) and have a positive sign. The numerical meaning of the coefficients is that the social justice indicator increases by about 0.009 points, when real GDP per capita increases by 1%. The French, German, and Socialist legal origin variables in column (5) lack statistical significance, whereas the Scandinavian legal origin variable is statistically significant at the 1% level with the expected positive sign. The numerical meaning is that, compared to countries with British legal origin, the weighted social justice indicator was about 1.7 points higher in countries with Scandinavian legal origin. 18 This effect is numerically important and perfectly corresponds with the descriptive statistics.
Column (1) of Table 2 reports the regression results when we use the unweighted social justice indicator. The results are very similar to the results in Table 1 . Columns (2) to (6) of Table 2 show the results for the social justice sub-indicators. Globalization has been associated with the sub-indicators on poverty prevention, social cohesion and equality, and intergenerational justice, while government ideology has not. Both globalization and 18 Scandinavian countries may enjoy higher levels of social justice as social trust has been shown to induce larger welfare states (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011). We include social trust for robustness tests (see section 4.2).
government ideology have not been associated with the sub-indicators on equitable access to education and labor market inclusiveness.
Our results support the compensation hypothesis (see section 2). Countries that experienced rapid globalization enjoy social justice. Regarding the sub-indicators our results support the compensation hypothesis for poverty prevention, social cohesion and equality, and intergenerational justice. The poverty prevention and intergenerational justice indicators are based on economic-policy measures which governments directly influence. Governments are likely to design these economic-policy measures to gratify their electorate. Globalization has already been shown to increase social cohesion and equality (Gray et al. 2006, Potrafke and Ursprung 2012) . The equitable access to education indicator consists of future-oriented measures and the labor market inclusiveness indicator consists of market outcomes. It is conceivable that governments are less future-oriented but election-motivated and that governments do not directly influence market outcomes.
Robustness tests
We tested the robustness of our results in several ways. When we consider only the 24 established industrialized countries over the 1991-2007 period (that is excluding Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Turkey), globalization lacks statistical significance in two more specifications (replicating the specifications including globalization in Tables 1 and 2 ) as compared to our baseline model. When we consider only the 24 oldest OECD member states over the 1991-2007 period (that is excluding Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and South Korea), globalization lacks statistical significance in one more specification (replicating the specifications including globalization in Tables 1 and 2 ) as compared to our baseline model. Inferences regarding globalization and social justice do however not change.
We also tested whether the results depend on the time period considered. We therefore replaced the averaged globalization, government ideology, and log real GDP per capita Tables 1 and 2 ). The KOF index of political globalization, by contrast, does not turn out to be statistically significant in any regression equation (except column 4 of Table 2 ).
We tested whether the results are sensitive to including social trust by using the data on social trust compiled by Bjørnskov and Méon (2013) . Table 3 shows the results for the weighted social justice indicator (compare Table 1 ). Social trust is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (4), but lacks statistical significance in column (5). Including social trust renders the globalization variable to be statistically significant only at the 10% level in column (4), but does not change the inferences regarding the globalization variable in columns (1), (3), and (5). These findings perfectly correspond with our expectations, as the correlation coefficient between social trust and the weighted social justice indicator is 0.77, the correlation coefficient between social trust and globalization is 0.50, and social trust and legal origin are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient between social trust and the Scandinavian legal origin, for example, is 0.69).
It is conceivable that the global financial crisis influenced social justice in individual countries. For most of the OECD countries, the effects of the crisis were most pronounced in 2009. We tested whether the crisis influenced social justice by including the annual real GDP per capita growth rate in 2009 (PPP converted) as a control variable. Replicating Tables 1 and   2 , inferences regarding globalization do not change. The annual real GDP per capita growth rate in 2009 does not turn out to be statistically significant in any specification, except when we replicate column (5) of Table 2 (results not shown).
We tested whether the reported effects are driven or mitigated by idiosyncratic circumstances in individual countries. For this reason, we tested whether the results are sensitive to including/excluding individual countries. Our results (not reported here) indicate that this is not the case. Only when we exclude Japan globalization lacks statistical significance in two more specifications (replicating the specifications including globalization in Tables 1 and 2 ) as compared to our baseline model.
Conclusions
By employing the new social justice indicators of the Bertelsmann Stiftung, we have investigated the relationship between globalization and social justice in OECD countries. The results show that countries that experienced rapid globalization enjoy social justice. The results are important because advocates of the dark side of globalization propagate the view that globalization reduces social justice.
It is conceivable that globalization enhances social justice because voters demand more active governments when globalization is proceeding rapidly. The relationship between globalization and social justice is pronounced for poverty prevention, social cohesion and equality, and intergenerational justice, and thus supports the compensation hypothesis.
Globalization, however, was not associated with the indicators on equitable access to education and labor market inclusiveness. These findings are plausible because the equitable access to education indicator is based on future-oriented measures and election-motivated governments are more concerned about the present than the future. Governments also do not directly influence market outcomes on which the labor market inclusiveness indicator is based.
Future studies may corroborate our findings by using survey/micro data. An issue is who is adamant in maintaining that globalization induces social justice. Per capita income and political preferences are likely to influence views on social justice. When micro data including personal views on social justice are available, studies may well include the KOF globalization indices and interact the KOF globalization indices with personal characteristics such as per capita income and political preferences to describe views on social justice.
Our results suggest that governments should not be influenced by social-justice arguments to adopt policies that impede or counter globalization. Of course, with policy determined by political competition (Ursprung 1991) , the policy implications relate to perceptions by voters of their personal costs and benefits from globalization. Voters concerned with their own welfare and with broad objectives of social justice may well support pro-globalization policies. Intergenerational justice sub-indicator and overall globalization Heston et al. (2012) 
